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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
THOMAS C. JACKSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
\ Case No. 920346-CA 
i Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTION 
The state claims to have jurisdiction in this case based on § 
77-18a-l(2)(a) Utah Code Ann. However, the State has no right to 
appeal the case, since the Order appealed is an order of acquittal, 
rather than an order of dismissal. Since the State cannot appeal 
the decision, the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The state claims only one issue in this appeal. However, 
several issues must be addressed. 
1. Is the State statutorily barred from bringing this 
appeal? 
2# Is the appeal moot because the appeal brought by the 
State is in violation of the Double Jeopardy clauses of 
the Federal and State Constitutions? 
3. Did the trial court properly grant Defendant' s motion for 
a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 17(o) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and §77-17-3 of the Utah Code 
Annotated? 
The jurisdictional questions raised in the first two issues are 
ones which must be addressed by the court before it can proceed to 
the merits. The Court of Appeals in Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P. 2d 
1230 (1987) held: 
The fundamental and initial inquiry of a court is always 
to determine its own jurisdictional authority over the 
subject matter of the claims asserted. Upon a 
determination by the Court that its jurisdiction is 
lacking, its authority extends no further than to dismiss 
the action. 
The standard of review for questions of law would be one of 
correctness. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 
(Utah 1990), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). However, no 
particular standard of review has been established for reviewing a 
trial court's decision directing a verdict in favor of the 
Defendant, pursuant to Rule 17(o) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and §77-17-3 of the Utah Code Ann., since these decisions 
are deemed acquittals by statute. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a dismissal of fourteen counts of 
theft, all class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (1990), in the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for 
Garfield County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
presiding. (R. 84-89). At defendants jury trial, counts I and II 
were dismissed with prejudice by stipulation (Order, R. 152, 
attached at Addendum A). Counts XVI and XVII were dismissed 
because evidence showed that property alleged to have been taken 
was inaccessible to defendant (R. 152-153; T. 200-02). The trial 
court granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the 
2 
remaining counts, finding that the State failed to present 
believable evidence of intent to commit the theft (R. 153; T. 200-
05). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Court ordered the case dismissed based on insufficient 
evidence by the prosecution, particularly evidence relating to 
Defendant's unauthorized control of the property and the intent to 
permanently deprive. See, Addendum A. 
2. The fourteen counts being appealed were derived from a 
statement given by Mr. Jackson to an officer that he had been 
authorized to take 6 to 9 gallons of diesel a week to cover his use 
of his personal vehicle. (T. 197-198). 
3. The central question remaining in the case was whether Mr. 
Jackson had been actually authorized to take the fuel. Both the 
superintendent with authority to allow Mr. Jackson to take the fuel 
and the investigating officer testified that there was a 
possibility of a mistake on Mr. Jackson's part in believing that he 
was authorized. (T. 169, 196). 
4. Faced with a substantial likelihood that the Defendant had 
been mistaken in believing he was authorized to take 6 to 9 gallons 
a week, the trial court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 
the close of the prosecution's case. (T. 204). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules 
are compiled in Addendum B. The applicable statutes are §76-1-403; 
§77-17-3 and §77-18a-l of the Utah Code Annotated. The applicable 
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rule is Rule 17(o) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The 
applicable constitutional provisions are the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The State does not have the right to appeal the acquittal of 
Mr. Jackson. A directed verdict for insufficient evidence at the 
close of the prosecution's case acts as an acquittal as defined in 
§76-1-403 of the Utah Code Ann. Acquittals are non-appealable. 
In a similar vein, jeopardy attached when the jury was sworn 
and the evidence was presented. The subsequent acquittal, via the 
directed verdict, acts as a bar to the appeal under the State and 
Federal Constitutions. 
Finally, the prosecution failed to produce believable evidence 
of the Defendant's intent to commit the crime of theft. Of the 
fourteen counts that were dismissed, only two counts involved any 
actual witnesses. The individual who could authorize the use of 
the fuel stated under oath that the Defendant could have been 
mistaken about his authorization to utilize company fuel. He also 
stated that he had authorized the Defendant to take fuel on at 
least one occasion and had authorized other workers to use hundreds 
of gallons of fuel during the same time period. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE STATE HAS NO STATUTORY RIGHT 
TO APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER. 
The Order of the District Court acted as an acquittal, which 
the State does not have the right to appeal. The State is claiming 
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its right to appeal based on §77-18a-l(2) (a) of the Utah Code Ann., 
which states "An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: (a) 
A final judgment of dismissal . . . " 
The threshold question for determining whether the State can 
appeal the May 4, 1992 Order is whether the Order acts as a 
dismissal or an acquittal. The Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1983), stated: 
The label attached to a ruling by a trial judge is not 
determinative of whether the termination of a criminal 
prosecution is an acquittal* United States v. Scott, 437 
U.S. 82, 96-97 (1980); United States v. Martin Linen 
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). A ruling that 
constitutes a factual resolution in favor of the 
defendant on one or more of the elements of the offense 
charged is an acquittal. United States v. Scott, supra at 
97; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra at 
571. 
In the instant case, the trial court "dismissed1 the 
theft charges because of its determination that there was 
inadequate proof of the requisite intent to commit the 
crime charged. Although the ruling was labeled a 
•dismissal1 by the trial court, it was clearly based on 
the trial court's assessment of the evidence and is an 
acquittal and not a 'dismissal1 as that term is used in AU 
71-35-26(c). See United States v. Scott, supra; United 
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra. The State's 
appeal of the theft counts must, therefore, be dismissed 
because an acquittal is not appealable. Cf. State v. 
Davenport, 30 Utah 2d 298, 517 P.2d 544 (1973); State v. 
Overson, 26 Utah 2d 313, 489 P.2d 110 (1971). 
(emphasis added). 
The statutory definition of "acquittal" is found in §76-1-
403(2) of the Utah Code Ann. The statute states: 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution 
resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts 
or in a determination that there was insufficient 
evidence to warrant conviction. . . . 
(emphasis added). An acquittal is not narrowly defined to include 
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only a finding of not guilty by the trier of fact An acquittal 
also occurs when a determination is made that there is insufficient 
evidence to warrant the conviction• The Order signed by the 
District Court specifically sets forth the grounds for acquitting 
Mr. Jackson: "[T]he Court is of the opinion that the State failed 
to present sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case on 
any of the remaining counts of the information." (emphasis added). 
The Court's May 4, 1992 Order was based on Rule 17(o) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 17(o) states: 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the 
prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, 
the court may issue an order dismissing any information 
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that 
the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the 
offense charged or any lesser included offense. 
(emphasis added). The applicable statutory provision is §77-17-3 
of the Utah Code Ann. which contains similar language: 
When it appears to the court that there is not 
sufficient evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it 
shall forthwith order him discharged. 
(emphasis added). 
The Court's Order, the applicable rule and the applicable 
statute allowing the court to make the acquittal ruling, state that 
the ground for a directed verdict is for insufficient evidence. 
Under the definition in §76-1-403(2), the Court's Order was an 
acquittal, which cannot be appealed. 
The State, in its brief, makes various arguments about the strength 
of the trial court's finding of insufficient evidence. This is not 
relevant. "Section 77-35-26(c) [currently §77-18a-l] does not 
authorize the State to appeal an acquittal, no matter how 
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overwhelming the evidence against the defendant may be." 
MusselmanF at 1065. 
II. 
THE STATE'S APPEAL VIOLATES THE 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE U.S. AND UTAH 
CONSTITUTIONS 
In conjunction with the fact that the state is statutorily 
barred from appealing the trial courtfs Order, this appeal violates 
the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions. 
Jeopardy attached when the jury was sworn and evidence was 
presented. The very issue before the Court in this case was 
presented in State v. Musselman, supra, at 1065: 
An appellate court, on principles deeply rooted in the 
double jeopardy clauses of the Utah and Federal 
constitutions, and by the very nature of the judicial 
process itself, may not reassess an acquittal even though 
the acquittal was made under an incorrect application of 
the law or an improper determination of the facts. United 
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra. Once a criminal 
charge has resulted in an acquittal by the trier of fact, 
the prohibition against double jeopardy prevents that 
determination from ever again being challenged. It is of 
no consequence that the determination was made as a 
matter of law by a directed verdict of acquittal, AX2 or 
as a matter of fact by the trier of fact. See, e.g., 
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982); United States 
v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra; United States v. Ball, 
163 U.S. 662 (1896). AX3 Furthermore, for an appellate 
court to render an opinion on appeal from an acquittal 
would be to render an advisory opinion, which is beyond 
our power. See State v. Overson, supra. 
(emphasis added). See, also. State v. Chuqq, 749 P.2d 1279 (1988) 
[Appeal can't be taken from a directed verdict in a DUI case]. 
Even the case most heavily relied on by the State in their 
brief was merely an advisory opinion. State v. Thatcher, 157 P.2d 
258 (1946) involved a directed verdict based on the insufficient 
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evidence of recklessness by the Defendant. The case ended in the 
following words: 
This being an appeal by the state in a criminal case, 
the case is reversed but the trial court is directed to 
proceed no further. 
State v. Thatcher, 157 P.2d 258, 262 (1945). The current position 
of the appellate courts is to not issue such advisory opinions when 
the case before them is moot on account of the double jeopardy 
clauses. See, Musselman, at 1065; Chugg, at 1280; and State v. 
Overson, 489 P.2d 110 (1971). 
Both the Chugg and Musselman decisions dealt with appeals from 
directed verdicts in a bench trial. The Thatcher decision involved 
a directed verdict in a jury trial. The mere fact that a directed 
verdict came in bench trial, rather than in jury trial, is of no 
consequence in relation to double jeopardy considerations. The 
grounds for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 17(o) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure are the same for bench trials and 
jury trials. As stated earlier in Musselman, "[i]t is of no 
consequence that the determination was made as a matter of law by 
a directed verdict of acquittal, or as a matter of fact by the 
trier of fact." Musselman at 1065. 
This appeal of Mr. Jackson's acquittal is in violation of the 
double jeopardy clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions as 
defined in the Musselman case. The case law is clear that a 
directed verdict by the trial court in a criminal case, when based 
on a finding of insufficient evidence, is an acquittal and non-
appealable. 
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III. 
THE COURT RULED PROPERLY IN FINDING 
THAT THE STATE HAD FAILED TO PROVIDE 
SUFFICIENT BELIEVABLE EVIDENCE TO 
PUT THE DEFENDANT TO HIS DEFENSE 
As stated earlier, §77-17-3 and Rule 17(o) set forth the 
guidelines in determining whether or not the trial court should 
direct a verdict at the close of the prosecution's case. In State 
v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah 1992), the Supreme Court 
restated the statutory grounds for review in a motion to dismiss: 
When a motion for a directed verdict is made at the 
close of the State's case, the trial court should dismiss 
the charge if the State did not establish a prima facie 
case against the defendant by producing 'believable 
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged.' 
The situation in the case currently before the court was that 
the prosecution had failed to present any believable evidence upon 
which a reasonable jury could find that a crime had been committed. 
Of the fourteen counts which are at issue in this appeal, only two 
involve witnesses. The first occasion involved two witnesses who 
saw the Defendant with the hose in his hand. (T. 87, 115). One 
witness to this event stated that he had no personal knowledge, 
even after seeing Mr. Jackson with the hose, that any diesel fuel 
had been taken. (T. 121). The other witness also stated that she 
had no personal knowledge, despite what she had witnessed, that Mr. 
Jackson took any fuel (T. 100). The witness stated that checking 
the nozzle was part of Mr. Jackson's job as a security guard (T. 
98-99). She also stated that it was mechanically impossible for the 
nozzle she witnessed Mr. Jackson holding to have fit his truck's 
tank (T. 101). Finally, the witness testified that she couldn't 
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hear a pump running and it was impossible to get fuel without the 
pump running (T. 104). 
The questionable value of this testimony becomes even more 
ridiculous, when it is not even tied to a specific count in the 
information. No exact date or time, just a general time period, 
was obtained from the witnesses. The fact that Mr. Jackson had a 
nozzle in his hand (which didn't fit his gas tank) was nothing out 
of the ordinary. It was part of his job as security officer on the 
Burr Trail to check on whether or not equipment had been tampered 
with. 
The other eyewitness occasion was the planned event by Mr. 
Haws. In his testimony, he stated that he didn't want any action 
taken until he could catch Mr. Jackson in the act, which he said he 
did a week later (T. 167). Mr. Haws was also the only individual 
on the job site who could authorize the use of diesel fuel. In the 
same time period that Mr. Jackson was charged with theft of less 
than 140 gallons of diesel, over 2,577 gallons of gasoline were 
used by other employees for their personal vehicles (T. 169). Mr. 
Haws testimony on recross is particularly telling: 
Q The standard company rule, I mean if there was a general 
rule and we could put it down in writing would be: You used 
your vehicle for company use, talk to you, you got gas; is 
that right? 
A Um-hum. 
Q To shorten it down, it would be if you use your personal 
vehicle for company use, you get gas; is that the rule? 
A If they go through me, yes. 
. . . 
Q Okay. All you can tell the Court is that Mr. Jackson might 
have had a mistaken assumption; is that right? 
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A Yes. 
Q But if he assumed wrongly, it wouldn't be criminal, would 
it? 
A It wouldnft be. But— 
Q Okay. And he offered to pay you back because he was sorry 
about the mistake; right? 
A Yes 
(T. 169-170). Mr. Haws, in his earlier testimony, could recall no 
instance in which he actually informed him of the company policy 
(T. 139). It was faced with this weak testimony that the trial 
court found that no believable evidence had been presented that Mr. 
Jackson had committed the crime of theft (T. 203-204). 
Finally, the State in their brief, rely on the judge's 
statement that even if the jury were to convict the defendant, it 
would feel compelled to grant a motion to dismiss after the 
completion of the case because of the insufficient evidence (T. 
204). This statement by the court is not an admission that a 
reasonable jury could find Mr. Jackson guilty, but an appropriate 
rendition of the law set forth in §77-17-3. 
Although the finding of a directed verdict is a matter of law 
for the trial court, by necessity, the court must rule on the 
believability of the evidence presented to that point. See, §77-
17-3 and Rule 17(o). The evidence in this case was so weak and 
watered down that no believable evidence was presented to prove 
intent. The trial court was merely fulfilling its statutory duty. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellee respectfully requests that the court find 
that the State has no right to make this appeal and that the appeal 
is in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the State and 
Federal Constitutions. Furthermore, the trial court was acting 
within its statutory powers when it properly dismissed the fourteen 
counts. 
Submitted this 15th day of January, 1993. 
& _ 
E. Kent Winward 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Kenneth A. Bronston, Assistant Attorney General, attorney for 
appellant, 236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on the 
19th day of January, 1993. fee 
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ADDENDUM A 
WALLACE A. LEE #5306 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah C4759 
Telephone: 676-2290 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
ve, ; 
TOM JACKSON, j 
Defendant. ; 
1 ORDER 
i Criminal No. 91-CR-309 
This matter came before the Court for jury trial on the 19th 
day of March, 1992, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs presiding* 
Defendant was present in Court and was represented by his attorney, 
E* Kent Winward. The State of Utah was represented by Wallace A-
Lee, Garfield County Attorney. 
By stipulation of Counsel, Counts I and II of the information 
were dismissed with prejudice. After the jury was impaneled and 
sworn, the Court and jury heard opening statements of counsel and 
testimony of witnesses for the state of Utah. After the State of 
Utah rested its case, Defendant moved for dismissal of Counts XVI 
and xvil§ and the motion was granted because during the period of 
time covered by these two counts, the fuel tank and equipment at 
NO 3l^JL^D3 FILED 
MAY 01 l%> 
Clerk 
o W v ^ y "^ \vn_y pcrt- • 
are vs. Jackson Criminal N 91-CR-309 
dei 
the site %/ere locked, and Defendant could not have taken fuel from 
them. 
After the Court dismissed Counts XVI and X*Llt the Defendant 
moved for a directed verdict on the remaining counts. After 
hearing arguments of counsel relative to the motion for directed 
verdictf tile Court is of the opinion that the State failed to 
present sufficicsxifc evidence to make o\*t a prima facie case on any 
of the remaining counts of th€* information. Specifically, the 
Court finds that the State of Utah did not present a prima facia 
case that Lefendant took unauthorized control over the property of 
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
NOW THEREFORE, Defendant's motion for a directed verdict is 
granted and this case Is hereby dismissed with prejudice, 
DATED this 3o day Of /L>s. L , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
ADDENDUM B 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for 
offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent 
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of 
the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was 
or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the 
former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the 
defendant that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and 
that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a 
fact that must be established to secure conviction in the 
subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a 
finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination 
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A 
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of 
the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a 
judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or 
vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; 
or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the 
termination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not 
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has been 
impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial 
is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination 
of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the 
termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the 
termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial 
in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not 
attributable to the state that would make any judgment entered 
upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not 
attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the 
trial without injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a 
fair trial. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-403, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, 
77-17-3. Discharge tor insufficient evidence. 
When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient 
evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith 
order him discharged. 
History: C. 1953, 11-11-3, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 15, 2* 
77-18a-l. Appeals - When proper* 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or 
plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the 
substantial rights of the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review 
the appellate court decides the appeal would be in the interest 
of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason 
of a mental disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a 
pending prosecution. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a 
finding of double jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part 
of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to 
suppress evidence when upon a petition for review the appellate 
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of 
justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty or no contest. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-l, enacted by L. 1990, ch. 7, 10. 
Compiler's Notes. - This chapter recodifies Subsections (2), 
(3), and (9) of former Section 77-35-26, which is Rule 26 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. For notes to cases construing 
that rule, see the Court Rules volume. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1990, ch. 7, 12 makes the act 
effective on July 1, 1990. 
RULE 17 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at 
the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order 
dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof, 
upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense• 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process of law 
and just compensation clauses*] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
Sec* 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to" have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases, In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fe^s to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
History: Const, 1896. 
Cross-References* - Rights of defendants, statutory provisions, 
77-1-6. 
